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I. INTRODUCTION-LouISIANA'S BUSINESS CLIMATE
Louisiana has traditionally performed poorly in attracting
businesses, increasing jobs, and retaining the state's talented and
intelligent youth. Even though Louisiana has the highest
percentage of native born residents in the United States, it loses
many more people to other states than it attracts. ' Consequently, it
is one of the slowest growing states in the country in terms of
population.2 Louisiana is one of only two southern states with
more people moving out than moving in.3  A loss of 75,000
citizens due to domestic migration was experienced over the most
recent five-year period reported by the Census Bureau.4 The
population flight has been further exacerbated by Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita. Those citizens who were previously committed
to a life in Louisiana, but who were forced to leave temporarily,
are discovering that the grass may actually be greener on the other
side of the Sabine River. A loss of this many citizens, regardless
of the cause, corresponds to a loss of desperately needed revenues
for the state.
A large portion of this migration can be attributed to job
opportunities in Louisiana that are inferior to those of neighboring
states. No doubt, the "brain drain" suffered by Louisiana has been
a disconcerting problem. Convincing Louisiana's youth to stay
and pursue higher education in the state has been difficult. Trying
to hold onto young people after graduation has been even harder.
Louisiana's poor business climate, particularly lacking in high-
paying and diverse job opportunities, is partly to blame for this
phenomenon.
Copyright 2007, by LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw.
1. United States Census Bureau, Census Report 2000, available at
http://www.census.gov/census20O0/states/la.html.
2. Id. West Virginia is the other state meeting this criteria. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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This comment will compare and contrast the two attempts of
the Louisiana Legislature to turn around the state's economic
outlook. Section II introduces Louisiana's innovative first attempt
at stimulating venture capital investments, the CAPCO Program,
and follows with an outline of some of the program's problems.
Section III details the newly enacted Angel Investor Tax Credit
and compares it with CAPCO while noting improvements as well
as shortcomings. Finally, Section IV questions the need for such
tax credit programs as a stimulus for Louisiana's economy and
recommends some alternatives.
II. THE FIRST EFFORT AT STIMULATING GROWTH-CAPCO
PROGRAM
In 1983, the Louisiana Legislature, recognizing the need to
address the problems facing the state, implemented a tax incentive
program to help jumpstart the state's economy. The Louisiana
Capital Companies Tax Credit Program ("CAPCO Program") was
designed to assist in the formation and expansion of new
businesses, thus creating new jobs in the state. 5 This new program
was intended to help provide venture capital to qualified Louisiana
businesses by providing tax incentives to investors in capital
companies who would distribute the needed capital.6 Louisiana
became an innovator with the CAPCO Program, as it was the first
state in the country to attempt to encourage a venture capital
community in such a manner. Since Louisiana's action in 1983,
many other states have followed suit, instituting their own versions
of the certified capital company program.7
A. How It Works
The Louisiana CAPCO Program, as it currently exists, operates
in the following manner. Any person is entitled to a tax credit
5. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51:1922 (2003).
6. Id.; id. § 51:1924.
7. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-3.5-101 et seq. (2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
288.99 et seq. (West Supp. 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 48-18-2 (repealed 2004);
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 4.51 et seq. (Supp. 2004-2005); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
560.30 et seq. (Supp. 2004).
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equal to thirty-five percent of their cash investment in the certified
capital fund of a certified Louisiana capital company (termed a
"CAPCO").8  Insurance companies get an even better deal,
receiving a one hundred percent credit against their premium tax
liability for their investment in a certified Louisiana capital
company, but they have to take the credit in equal portions over ten
years.9 The term "certified Louisiana capital company" is defined
by the legislature as a legal entity, whether for-profit or non-profit,
whose primary business activity is the investment of cash for the
purpose of acquiring equity in, or providing financing assistance as
a licensed business and industrial development corporation to,
qualified Louisiana businesses in need of capital for survival,
expansion, new product development, or other similar business
purposes, and is certified as meeting the program's criteria.' 0
Louisiana has strict requirements for continuing certification of
a CAPCO's investment pools as certified capital. To be initially
certified as a CAPCO, the compan, must have had an initial
capitalization of $200,000 or greater. To continue certification, a
CAPCO must follow a set schedule for making qualified
investments from each of its investment pools. Within three years
of the investment date for each investment pool, at least fifty
percent of the pool must be invested, with at least thirty percent
invested in qualified investments.' Five years from the
investment date, eighty percent of the pool must be invested, with
at least fifty percent of the pool invested in qualified investments.
13
The program also places limitations on what is a "qualified
investment" by a CAPCO. The investment must further or attempt
to further economic development within Louisiana. 14  It must
either be a cash investment resulting in equity in a qualified
Louisiana business or an amount to provide cash financial
assistance to a qualified Louisiana business through a licensed
8. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1924(A)-(B)(1) (2003).
9. Id. § 22:1068(E)(1)(a) and (3); id. § 51:1924(A).
10. Id. § 51:1923(3).
11. Id.
12. Id. § 51:1926(A)(1).
13. Id. § 51:1926(A)(2).
14. Id. § 51:1923(12).
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Louisiana business and industrial development corporation.' 5 A
qualified investment also may be: an equity investment or a debt
investment maturing within five years from the origination of the
debt investment in an approved qualified venture fund;16 an equity
or a debt investment in an approved Louisiana based economic
development infrastructure project; 17 or an equity or a debt
investment in an approved qualified technology fund.' 8 The
CAPCO statutes expressly exclude the following from being a
qualified investment for continuing certification purposes:
investments in businesses primarily engaged in oil and gas
exploration and development, gaming, real estate development for
resale, banking, lending (with a few exceptions), insurance, or
professional services provided by accountants, lawyers, or
physicians; 19 investments: in associates of certified Louisiana
CAPCOs; 20 any portion of a CAPCO's investments in qualified
Louisiana businesses that exceeds fifteen percent of its total
certified capital; 2 1 qualified investments that are already claimed
by another Louisiana CAPCO; 22 and reciprocal investments or
loans made between certified CAPCOs.23
"Qualified Louisiana businesses," the intended beneficiaries of
the CAPCO Program, are businesses that meet each of the
following requirements at the time of investment or as the direct
result of investment.24  First, the business must: (1) primarily
operate or perform substantially all of its production in Louisiana
or be headquartered in Louisiana with a substantial portion of its
assets located in Louisiana; (2) be in need of capital; (3) be in
retail, product manufacturing, processing, or assembly, research
and development, or providing services; and (4) have at least
eighty percent of its employees receiving eighty percent of its
15. Id. § 51:1923(12)(a).
16. Id. § 51:1923(12)(b).
17. Id. § 51:1923(12)(c).
18. Id. § 51:1923(12)(d).
19. Id. § 51:1926(A)(3)(a).
20. Id. § 51:1926(A)(3)(b).
21. Id. § 51:1926(A)(3)(c).
22. Id. § 51:1926(A)(3)(d).
23. Id. § 51:1926(A)(3)(e).
24. Id. § 51:1923(13)(a).
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payroll domiciled in Louisiana.25  Second, the business's net
worth, together with its affiliates, must not exceed $18 million.26
Third, the business and its affiliates must not have more than $6
27million in average annual net income. Fourth, no more than 500
employees may work for the business and its affiliates. 2' If a
business is classified as a qualified Louisiana business upon the
first investment by a CAPCO, it retains the classification for each
subsequent qualified investment by that CAPCO.29
A CAPCO may be decertified, either voluntarily or
involuntarily. If the CAPCO fails to meet the requirements of the
program, particularly by failing to follow the investment schedule
and failing to make qualified investments, it is subject to
involuntary certificationi. 0 If the only violation is that one of the
CAPCO's investment pools is not following the investment
schedule, only the noncomplying investment pool is decertified.3'
If a CAPCO or one of its investment pools is involuntarily
decertified, some of the associated tax credits may be subject to
repayment or forfeiture. If the CAPCO or one of its investment
pools was never in compliance with the investment schedule,
meaning it never met the year three investment requirement, all
income and premium tax credits already claimed must be repaid
and any remaining credits are forfeited.32 If the CAPCO or
investment pool complied with the third-year requirement in the
investment schedule, but failed to meet the fifth-year investment
requirement, only insurance premium tax credits that have or will
be claimed after the third year from the investment date must be
repaid or forfeited.33 Decertification of the CAPCO after it has
fully complied with the investment schedule does not result in any
credit repayment or forfeiture.34
25. Id. § 51:1923(13)(a)(i).
26. Id. § 51:1923(13)(a)(ii).
27. Id. § 51:1923(13)(a)(iii).
28. Id. § 51:1923(13)(a)(iv).
29. Id. § 51:1923(13)(b).
30. Id. § 51:1927(B).
31. Id.
32. Id. § 51:1927(C)(1).
33. Id. § 51:1927(C)(2) and (3).
34. Id. § 51:1927(C)(4).
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Voluntary decertification may be accomplished at any time by
sending written notice and remitting to the Department of Revenue
the amount of tax credits to be repaid pursuant to the same
provisions as for involuntary decertification.35 The CAPCO, as a
subrogee to Louisiana's right to repayment, then has to recover
from its investors the sums paid back to the state.36 Voluntary
decertification under certain circumstances, and with the state's
approval, will not result in any tax credit forfeiture or retaliation.37
A taxpayer claims the CAPCO tax credit for the year in which
the investment is made.38 The credit used may not be greater than
the taxpayer's tax liability for that tax year, but any excess credit
can be carried forward to subsequent tax years until the entire
credit is used by the taxpayer. 39  CAPCO tax credits may be
transferred or sold, but only between affiliates and sophisticated
investors, and only once per calendar quarter.4 °
There are some limitations on the CAPCO credits. The tax
credit claimed must be certified by the Office of Financial
Institutions to the Department of Revenue. 41 A 2002 amendment
added the restriction that the total credits taken against all of the
taxpayer's income taxes in a calendar year may not result in more
than an additional $2 million income tax revenue reduction for that
42year. Premium tax credits may not reduce the revenues by more
than $5 million over the prior year.43 In years when this restriction
actually limits the tax credits allowed by the CAPCO Program, the
credit is allocated by CAPCO pursuant to a detailed procedure.
44
35. Id. § 51:1928(A).
36. Id.
37. Id. § 51:1928(B). This subsection provides for three specific sets of
circumstances in which a "certified Louisiana capital company may voluntarily
decertify" particular investment pools. Id.
38. Id. § 51:1924(A).
39. Id. § 51:1924(E).
40. Id. § 51:1924(F).
41. Id. § 51:1923(5); id. § 51:1924(A).
42. Id. § 51:1924(B)(2).
43. Id. § 51:1924(D)(1).
44. See id. § 51:1924(B)(3) and (D)(2) for how CAPCO allocates the tax
credit.
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B. Problems Associated with the CAPCO Program
Louisiana's CAPCO Program has undergone a significant
amount of tinkering by the legislature over the years. Adjustments
were to be expected, as the Louisiana program was the first of its
kind. As a result, the program has produced some positive results.
According to a 1999 study commissioned by the Department of
Economic Development,45 the program raised an estimated $683
million in capital over twelve years of operation.46 However, the
CAPCO Program has still been widely criticized as inefficient and
ineffective in some respects.
The program was quite costly to Louisiana in terms of lost
revenue. The benefits, especially in the short term, seemed to pale
in comparison. The legislature did not limit the amount of
premium tax credits the state could issue until 1998, and it
overlooked a limitation on income tax credits.47 For fifteen years
of the program's existence, the state was free to authorize an
unlimited amount of tax credits. In 1998, the state actually had to
negotiate an installment plan with two CAPCOs that had solicited
investments generating more than $60 million in income tax
credits, which could have been claimed immediately.48 Because
the premium tax credits are taken over a ten-year period, the state
has been obligated4 9 to provide $610 million in tax credits from
1988 through 2009.50 Therefore, the state will still be paying a
hefty price for the program long after its termination and
investments cease.
Several operational issues of the CAPCO Program were also
questionable. The definition of "qualified Louisiana business" was
arguably too lenient, particularly because it did not require a
45. The seemingly outdated study was conducted at the peak of the CAPCO
program, which remained relatively constant for the remainder of its run.
46. Postlethwaite & Netterville, CAPCO Study: Prepared for Louisiana
Department of Economic Development 62 (Dec. 31, 1999) (unpublished report,
on file with Hill Memorial Library, Louisiana State University).
47. See 1998 La. Acts No. 70, § 1924.
48. Postlethwaite & Netterville, supra note 46, at 28.
49. Louisiana was obligated for this amount as of 1999.
50. Postlethwaite & Netterville, supra note 46, at 3.
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business to have its headquarters in the state. 5' Thus, the recipients
of the CAPCO funds were not the types of businesses that the
legislature sought to promote. The actual beneficiaries of the
CAPCO Program also appeared to deviate from the legislative
intent. Although Louisiana and its citizens would benefit from the
economic growth in the long run, the CAPCO Program proved
very lucrative for the CAPCO companies and its owners.
Attracting investment from risk averse insurance companies by
issuing notes secured by cash collateral, instead of equity, yielded
great profit for the CAPCO owners.52  Moreover, because
CAPCOs were required to post collateral, the CAPCOs were left
with less money for qualified investments.5 3 Thus, the CAPCO
Program resulted in an inefficient use of the state's resources. The
type of investments made by CAPCOs, beyond the program's
requirements, were arguably less aggressive since both the
insurance company and the CAPCO profited from the transaction
itself. The insurance company, without equity in the CAPCO, had
no interest in the CAPCO's investments, and its return was entirely
independent of their success, prompting calls for an "at risk"
requirement to encourage the most efficient use of the new capital.
Difficulties with CAPCOs were not unique to Louisiana. As
previously mentioned, many other states have followed in
Louisiana's footsteps and implemented a capital company tax
credit program, and some of them have experienced
disappointments with their programs. As a result of criticism by
the Colorado auditor and an independent organization, Colorado's
CAPCO Program was replaced by two other incentive programs.
5 4
The CAPCO Program, which was only in place for three years and
which used only half of the allotted credits, 5 was dubbed a failure
51. Id. at 20.
52. Id. at 35.
53. See id. at 36.
54. See Stephen A. Metz, Colorado Gets New Venture Capital Program;
CAPCOs Did Not Die, But Will Just Fade Away, J. MULTISTATE TAX'N, Nov.-
Dec. 2004, at 8.
55. See id. at 12.
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by Colorado's governor.56 The CAPCO program in Missouri was
also discredited, with a Missouri auditor concluding that any
benefits failed to offset its costs. 57 The net cost to the state was
$116.4 million; $140 million of tax credits only generated $23.6
million in additional revenues.58  Job creation was also
disappointing; an average of only 293 jobs were created per year
for fifteen years.59
With negative reviews from both in state and out, it is
understandable that Louisiana would soon look for another, more
efficient method of spurring economic development. Hence, the
issuance of CAPCO credits eventually expired. 60 However, a new
proposal was on the horizon.
III. LOUISIANA'S MOST RECENT EFFORT-THE ANGEL INVESTOR
TAx CREDIT
In its 2005 Regular Session, the Louisiana Legislature
unanimously passed a bill authorizing the Angel Investor Tax
Credit ("AITC"), effective on August 15, 2005, which has a
similar aim as the CAPCO Program.6 1 The AITC is intended to
enhance the welfare of the state through a healthy entrepreneurial
business environment, which requires ready sources of capital that
are not currently available.62 The AITC Program aims to achieve
this purpose by encouraging third parties to invest in early stage
wealth-creating businesses in the state, expanding Louisiana's
economy by enlarging its base of wealth-creating businesses, and
increasing the number of quality jobs available in order to retain
the presence of young people who are educated in Louisiana.63
56. Tripp Baltz, Colorado: Gov. Owens Signs Compromise Measures
Reforming Investment Tax Credit Program, 44 DAILY TAX REP. H-2 (2004),
http://www.westlaw.com (search 44 DTR H-2, 2004).
57. See Christopher Brown, Missouri: Auditor Says Two Credit Programs
Fail to Offset Their Costs to the State, 44 DAILY TAX REP. H-2 (2004),
http://westlaw.com (search 44 DTR H-2, 2004).
58. Id.
59. See id.
60. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51:1931 (2003).
61. See 2005 La. Acts No. 400, § 6020.
62. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6020(A) (Supp. 2006).
63. Id. § 47:6020(B).
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The statute authorizes this credit for tax years starting January 1,
2005, through December 31, 2009.64
A. How It Works
The AITC credit is a credit against a qualifying taxpayer's
Louisiana income or corporate franchise taxes equal to fifty
percent of the taxpayer's qualified investments in certified
Louisiana entrepreneurial businesses.65 The AITC statutes limit
the credit granted to $1 million per year per business with a $2
million aggregate limit per business over the life of the program.
66
There also is a limit on the aggregate amount of AITC credits that
may be issued per year. The Department of Economic
Development ("DED"), which administers the program, may not
grant Angel Investor tax credits for the program in excess of $5
million per calendar year.67 The taxpayer divides the credit
granted in one year and takes it in five equal portions during each
of five years within the ten-yIear period beginning in the year in
which the credit is granted.6 The credits expire in the eleventh
year after they are granted. 69  For income taxes, the credit is
generally claimed in the tax year in which it is earned, and credits
against franchise taxes are generally claimed in the tax year
following that in which the credit is earned. 70  There is an
exception to this schedule in the first year of the program, as
credits earned in 2005 cannot be claimed against income taxes
until the 2006 tax year and against franchise taxes for 2007.7 1
A taxpayer must meet each of several requirements in order to
qualify to claim the Angel Investor tax credit. First, the taxpayer's
investment in the Louisiana entrepreneurial business must not be
secured or guaranteed but, instead, must be "at risk," meaning the
64. 2005 La. Acts No. 400, § 6020.4(B).
65. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6020.1(A) (Supp. 2006); id. §
47:6020.2(A)(2)(a).
66. Id. § 47:6020.2(A)(1).
67. Id. § 47:6020.2(A)(2)(b).
68. Id. § 47:6020.2(A)(2)(a) and (B).
69. Id. § 47:6020.2(B).
70. Id. § 47:6020.2(A)(1).
71. Id.
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recoupment of the investment depends entirely on the success of
the business.72 Second, the funds invested must not have been
raised as a result of: (1) any other Louisiana tax incentive
programs; (2) funds that were pooled or organized through capital
placement agreements for purposes of equity and venture capital
investing unless approved by the DED; or (3) illegal activity. 73
Third, the investor(s) cannot be the principal owner(s) of the
business or involved professionally full-time in the operation of the
business.74 The same rule applies for the investors' spouses and
relatives within the third degree either by blood or by marriage. 7
5
A "principal owner" is one or more P ersons who combined own
fifty percent or more of the business. Fourth, the entrepreneurial
business must use the proceeds from the investment for capital
improvements, plant equipment, research and development,
working capital for the business, or other business activity as may
be approved by the DED.77 The proceeds cannot be used to pay
dividends, repay shareholder loans, redeem shares, or repay debt
unless approved by the DED.78 Finally, the investor must maintain
the investment in the entrepreneurial business for at least three
years unless the DED approves otherwise.79
The AITC statute strictly defines "Louisiana entrepreneurial
business" to ensure that the proceeds of the program achieve the
legislature's goals. A business must meet all four of the following
requirements to be eligible for certification by the DED. First, the
business must have its principal business operations located in
Louisiana. 0 Second, the DED must approve the business as
qualified to receive Angel Investor credits. 81 Third, the business
must demonstrate that it will be a wealth-creating business for
Louisiana, meaning that its business plan must show that the
72. Id. § 47:6020.1(C)(1)(a).
73. Id. § 47:6020.1(C)(1)(b).
74. Id. § 47:6020.1(C)(1)(c).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. § 47:6020.1(C)(1)(d).
78. Id.
79. Id. § 47:6020.1(C)(1)(f).
80. Id. § 47:6020.1(C)(2)(a).
81. Id. § 47:6020.1(C)(2)(b).
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business will have more than fifty percent of its sales from out of
state.8 2 Finally, the business cannot be primarily engaged in retail
sales, real estate, professional services, gaming or gambling,
natural resource extraction or exgloration, or financial services
including venture capital funds. Further, the AITC statute
incorporates the definition of "Louisiana entrepreneurial business"
from the Economic Development Act, which requires that the
business be domiciled in Louisiana, have fifty or fewer full-time
employees, and have either gross annual income of less than $10
million or a net worth of less than $2 million.
84
If all of the above requirements are met, a taxpayer investor
may use the tax credit. The taxpayer receives a tax credit
certificate from the DED, which certifies the eligibility of the
entrepreneurial business and the amount of the taxpayer's
investment A copy of this certificate is to be attached to the
taxpayer's tax return.8 6 Unless the DED rescinds the certificate,
the Department of Revenue must accept the tax credit certificate as
proof of the tax credit.
8 7
B. Improvements over CAPCO?
The AITC Program is a substantial improvement as a tax
incentive compared to the CAPCO Program. This is not surprising
since the program appears to be closely modeled after Maine's
established and successful angel investor credit.
88
First, the amount of tax revenues the state will lose because of
the tax credit is expressly limited at the outset, thereby minimizing
any unexpected budgetary issues. Since the AITC is set to be in
place for a fixed period of time, the Legislative Fiscal Office
evaluated the lost revenues as only $25 million over a ten-year
82. Id. § 47:6020.1(C)(2)(c).
83. Id. § 47:6020.1(C)(2)(d).
84. Id. § 47:6020.1(A); id. § 51:2303(5).
85. Id. § 47:6020.2(A)(2)(c).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Maine implemented the program in 1988. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
10, § 1100-T (2006).
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period. 89 The annual revenue loss will increase by $1 million each
year, peaking at $5 million in lost revenues in the fifth year of the
program.
90
The definition of "Louisiana entrepreneurial business," the
targeted beneficiary of the AITC Program, is much narrower than
the term "qualified business" under the CAPCO statutes. The
absolute requirement that an entrepreneurial business must have its
principal operations in Louisiana incorporates a logical
requirement that other states' CAPCO programs included.
Notably, the revenue, net worth, and employee restrictions are
much smaller than in the CAPCO Program. These limitations
should ensure that start-up and/or struggling companies receive the
funds they need under the AITC Program, regardless of the age of
the entity.
A substantial improvement of the AITC is the elimination of
the controversial and highly-criticized CAPCO structure. The
AITC is available only for funds invested directly into the types of
businesses the state wants to assist. This structure reduces the
needless waste generated by the CAPCO "middle-man" structure.
It assures that one hundred percent of the taxpayer's investment
goes immediately into the Louisiana entrepreneurial business,
instead of having a schedule for the investment over a period of
time. It also eliminates the conflicts of interest between the
CAPCO managers and its investors that are present in the CAPCO
structure. The Angel Investor Plan's "at risk" requirement for the
taxpayer's investment assures that the angel investors will make
more deliberate choices in determining the companies in which
they will invest, thus increasing the likelihood of meaningful long-
term economic development.
Another significant improvement of the AITC is the restriction
on how the entrepreneurial business uses the funds received from
the angel investor. These approved uses are aimed at fostering
positive growth and not merely enabling a business to stay afloat.
The new non-related requirement is also a positive addition; the
89. Greg Albrecht, Louisiana Legislative Fiscal Office, Fiscal Note On HB
627, http://www.legis.state.la.us/billdata/streamdocument.asp?did=319143 (last
visited Aug. 16, 2006).
90. Id.
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state should not give tax credits for investing in one's own
business. But in a state like Louisiana, it could act as a roadblock
for some otherwise desirable investments.
C. Potential Shortcomings
While the Angel Investor Tax Credit is an improvement over
the CAPCO Program, it has some shortcomings. The ability of the
AITC Program to achieve the legislature's goals is also
questionable.
The AITC provides for a maximum of $5 million in tax credits
over each of five years for a grand total of $25 million. These
credits correspond to $10 million of qualified investment annually
over five years for a total of $50 million in investment over the life
of the AITC Program. 91 The $50 million of capital that the AITC
Program will generate pales in comparison to the almost $700
million in documented capital raised by the CAPCO Program.
Additionally, the short lifespan of the program will not enable
legislators to adequately evaluate the program's effectiveness. It
often takes more than five years to observe any measurable impact
of a tax incentive program.
IV. IS THE AITC WORTH IT?
Most Louisiana residents will agree that the state needs help
with economic development. However, a question exists as to
whether throwing money at this problem actually will lead to a
solution. Most states use tax incentives to encourage business
activity, but the utility of such action is far from certain.
Each year, states across the nation spend over $50 billion on
business incentives hoping to spur economic activity and job
91. A rate of fifty percent of credit granted for qualified investments gives:
$5 million / 0.5 = $10 million per year. This calculation assumes that no more
than $5 million in credits is earned each year whereby each taxpayer realizes the
full amount of credit earned.
92. Robert G. Heard, National Governors Association, Growing New
Businesses With Seed and Venture Capital State Experiences and Options 17
(2000), http://nga.org/cda/files/vencapital.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2006).
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growth.93 These incentives may be in the form of investment tax
credits, job creation credits, property tax abatement programs, and
tax increment financing schemes. 94 Such incentives often become
quite costly. For instance, Alabama recently offered an incentive
package equal to $200,000 for each potential job created, and
Kentucky offered a deal worth $350,000 per job created.95 Some
incentives are aimed at attracting or keeping a particular business,
such as Ohio's offer of $300 million in benefits to keep Jeep's
plant located within the state's borders. Offers like these
encourage imitation and incite competition between states,
spurring the inevitable "race to the bottom. 97  Businesses
themselves even encourage tax incentive competition, having
become very skilled in obtaining incentives from states.
98
With the individual states clamoring to make the best and most
attractive offer, one might think that incentive programs are
actually effective. However, many commentators believe that tax
incentives are not as useful of an economic development tool as
many legislators think.99 Studies show that tax incentives actually
play a minor role in a business's decision to locate in a particular
area.100  Tax incentives are viewed as useless government
expenditures that reduce funding for and undermine other
governmental services that do play a major role in a business's
93. Kathleen A. Norat & Eileen M. Lomoriello, Clawbacks: A Help or a
Hindrance in Negotiating Incentive Benefits?, J. MULTISTATE TAx'N, Feb. 13,
2004, at 24, 26.
94. Peter D. Enrich, Business Tax Incentives: A Status Report, 34 URB.
LAW. 415, 417 (2002).
95. Scott J. Ziance, Making Economic Development Incentives More
Efficient, 30 URB. LAW. 33, 40 (1998).
96. Enrich, supra note 94, at 415.
97. Peter D. Enrich, Saving the State From Themselves: Commerce Clause
Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REv. 377, 380
(1996).
98. Andrew L. Kolesar, Note, Can State and Local Tax Incentives and
Other Contributions Stimulate Economic Development, 44 TAX LAW. 285, 293
(1990).
99. See Enrich, supra note 94, at 419; James R. Rogers, The Effectiveness
and Constitutionality of State Tax Incentive Policies for Locating Businesses: A
Simple Game of Theoretical Analysis, 53 TAx LAW. 431 (2000).
100. Kolesar, supra note 98, at 285.
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location selection.' 0' These influential factors include: the quality,
availability, and cost of labor (including quality of education and
technical expertise); the level and quality of public services; the
costs of utilities, transportation, and housing; the proximity to
markets, suppliers, and other company facilities; the regulatory
environment; the general tax climate; and the quality of life, which
includes the natural environment as well as entertainment.' 0 2 The
importance of skilled labor is illustrated by Texas Instruments'
("TI") decision to build a plant in Texas. TI executives were
influenced by the state's commitment to investing in local
engineering and computer science-oriented schools, which in turn
would provide the breeding ground for TI's future employees.' 0 3
Further evidence of the importance of these other factors is the
growth success of high tax, high spending areas (like California
and Georgia) over that of their low tax, low spending
counterparts. 0 4 The higher tax areas have more funds available to
invest in the factors that really attract businesses.
Tax incentives pose problems other than not targeting elements
that are important to businesses. By offering tax incentives, a state
sets a precedent leaving itself vulnerable to similar demands by
other businesses and interest groups in the future. 0 5 Further, states
with struggling economies, like Louisiana, are very easily
exploited by businesses. 106 It is also very hard to weigh the utility
of a particular economic development incentive. 0 7 Clearly, an
economic incentive is beneficial to a state if the revenue loss
outweighs the increased revenue from the program. 08 However,
even if the costs are easy to quantify, any revenue increase is very
speculative. 10 9 Adding to the difficulty in estimating the positive
101. Id.
102. Id. at 289.
103. Timothy A. Dunn, Business Tax Incentives: A Modem View Utilizing
Tiebout-Hamilton Rationales, 40 TEX. J. Bus. L. 235, 244 (2004).
104. Id. at 242; Kolesar, supra note 98, at 295.
105. Kolesar, supra note 98, at 296.
106. 1d. at 293.
107. Id. at 301.
108. Id. at 300.
109. Id. at 301.
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results of an incentive is a state's lack of power to prevent
businesses from relocating after benefiting from the incentives.
If tax incentives are of little benefit, then why do states use
them? The main proponents of tax incentives are politically, not
economically, motivated legislators who are driven by voter
perception." ° By offering these benefits, the politicians give the
appearance of trying to help the state."' Further, states are
pressured by the need to keep up with their neighbors."1
2
However, the impact of tax incentives is limited when every state
has the same goals and very similar means of trying to achieve
them. For example, at one time the so-called "movie tax credits"
were a novel and cutting edge idea in Louisiana. Now, most states,
including California, the home of Hollywood itself, either have
motion picture tax incentives or are considering them. Another
reason why tax incentives are so widely used is because there are
those that argue that tax policy and incentives matter by increasing
a business's return on investment, especially for those with smaller
profit margins. 1
3
The negative views of tax credits expose the potential fiscal
irresponsibility of offering costly, and arguably ineffective, tax
credits. This is especially true when these credits may pose a
serious threat to the state of Louisiana under the current
circumstances. Louisiana already offers an abundance of tax
credits for a variety of reasons, many of which were passed or
amended during the Louisiana Legislature's 2005 Legislative
Session. Further, the state inevitably will be burdened, financially
and otherwise, for many years to come by the vast reconstruction
efforts following the September 2005 hurricanes.
To mitigate these damaging effects, Louisiana should explore
some non-tax incentive options that are likely more efficient and
beneficial. One option is to pour government funds into other
areas that businesses find attractive, like education and
infrastructure, as noted above. 1 14 The benefits of this option are
110. Enrich, supra note 94, at 422.
111. Kolesar, supra note 98, at 307.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 292.
114. Id. at298.
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numerous. First, the costs of such improvements are fixed and are
often subsidized by the federal government. 1 5 Moreover, entire
communities, not just the targeted businesses, reap the benefits of
education and infrastructure improvements. Further, the benefits
are experienced regardless of the success in stimulating the
economy. 116 Other actions Louisiana may take include making
low interest loans and direct grants to businesses." 7 With the
inefficiency of some tax incentive schemes, as illustrated by the
CAPCO Program discussed above, direct expenditures like these
may in fact be more useful than tax incentives.
V. CONCLUSION
The Angel Investor Tax Credit possesses all of the elements of
a beneficial government incentive. It is modeled after a similar
program that has enjoyed success in another state. It incorporates
many of the lessons Louisiana learned from the administration of
the CAPCO Program. However, in the grand scheme, individual
state tax incentives are marginally successful at achieving positive
economic development in a country where all incentives start to
look alike. Furthermore, Louisiana's current fragile financial
condition makes the endless accumulation of tax incentives
incredibly risky. Louisiana needs to avoid the "race to the bottom"
with the rest of the country in the name of keeping and attracting
sources of economic growth to the state. Louisiana should explore
some other more responsible and potentially more effective
methods, like education and infrastructure improvements and
direct government funding of lucrative businesses.
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